Proportional influence? Electoral rules and special interest spending

Marko Köthenbürger, Peter Egger and Michael Smart
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marko Koethenbuerger

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that proportional representation leads to more coalition governments and so to greater government spending, especially in redistributive categories favoured by special-interest groups. In contrast, we show in a theoretical model that first-past-the-post systems of government may give special interests greater influence in the winning electoral coalition than they would have in the corresponding legislative coalition under proportional representation. Evidence from a quasi-experimental reform in German local government supports this view. Introduction of a mayor directly elected under first-past-the-post rules caused a significant increase in local government expenditure, particularly in redistributive spending categories.

JEL-codes: D72 H11 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100466

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