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Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison

Torben Stühmeier
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Stuehmeier

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Search frictions are classified as a main impediment to active competition in many markets. In some markets, such as in financial and retail gasoline markets, governments and consumer protection agencies call for a compulsory price reporting. Consumers should then more easily compare the firms' offers. We show that for a given level of price comparison, a mandatory price reporting indeed widely benefits consumers. The regulation, however, feeds back into firms' strategies, resulting in lower equilibrium levels of price comparison. This effect may dominate and the regulation may lead to higher expected market prices.

JEL-codes: D83 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mkt
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100482/1/VfS_2014_pid_581.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Price Disclosure Rules and Consumer Price Comparison (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100482

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