Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets

Enrico Böhme ()

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a simple framework with two distinct types of agents on market side 1, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly reduced below the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, the paper finds that it is feasible in the monopoly optimum that the bundle for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is assumed to be bundle-specific.

JEL-codes: D42 D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100507/1/VfS_2014_pid_131.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets (2016)
Working Paper: Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100507

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