Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: This paper analyzes the efficiency consequences of local revenue policies if jurisdictions try to attenuate the pressures of inter-regional competition for mobile factors by substituting attention-grabbing tax instruments that spotlight an additional tax burden with rather inconspicuous ones. We show that the substitution of tax instruments with the view to reduce the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that typically goes along with fiscal equalization.

JEL-codes: H22 H30 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/100622/1/VfS_2014_pid_938.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100622

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().