Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis

Friedrich Heinemann, Marc-Daniel Moessinger and Mustafa Yeter

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Numerical fiscal rules are implemented to counterbalance the deficit bias in budgetary policy. Over the recent years, an increasing number of studies try to test the actual effectiveness of fiscal rules. This meta-analysis condenses the existing evidence from different regional and federal contexts. It explores the study characteristics which are associated with different findings. Based on a preliminary analysis and a still incomplete sample of primary studies, the results point to a consensus that fiscal rules indeed constrain fiscal policies. This result also appears to hold in light of the criticism that rules are the endogenous reflection of fiscal preferences: even studies with a comprehensive control for fiscal preferences do not lead to systematically weaker levels of statistical significance.

JEL-codes: H61 H69 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis (2018)
Working Paper: Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112800

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