Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction

Mark Schopf and Achim Voß

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Consider a lobby group of exhaustible-resource suppliers, which bargains with the government over the extraction of an exhaustible resource and over contribution payments. We characterize the path of contributions and the resulting extraction path, taking into account how the environmental damage of resource usage and the demand elasticity change optimal extraction. A high marginal environmental flow damage reduces the government s preferred speed of extraction, a low price elasticity of resource demand reduces that of the lobby. Moreover, the lobby s preferred total extraction exceeds that of the government whenever environmental stock damages exist. Contribution payments are usually positive and declining, along with the conflict of interest between the government and the lobby. In some cases, they may be increasing for while, possibly from a negative level, but they eventually decline and vanish in the long run.

JEL-codes: D72 Q38 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying over exhaustible-resource extraction (2021)
Working Paper: Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction (2017)
Working Paper: Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112814

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