On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining

Veronika Grimm, Robert Feicht, Holger Rau and Gesine Stephan

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and six recipients that are divided into two groups of three. The proposer cannot discriminate among, but across group members. Acceptance decisions are taken by a committee of three representatives from one or both groups. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are more balanced if both groups have veto power (iii) acceptance rates are only high when the environment gives a clear idea of what an appropriate proposal is. Non--binding communication reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.

JEL-codes: C78 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
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Working Paper: On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112939

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