Surprising Gifts: Theory and Laboratory Evidence

Peter Werner, Kiryl Khalmetski and Axel Ockenfels

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients expectations on dictators transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.

JEL-codes: C91 D64 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (85)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Surprising Gifts - Theory and Laboratory Evidence (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113006

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