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Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Nora Szech and Nikolaus Schweizer

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in a market are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information in these markets affects welfare and revenues is of fundamental interest. We introduce new mathematical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for markets with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by release of information, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.

JEL-codes: D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mst
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release (2015) Downloads
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