The Role of Information in the Application for Merit-Based Scholarships: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Stefanie Herber

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: If information asymmetries prevent talented students of non-academic backgrounds from applying for merit-based aid, the full potential of qualified youth will not be unfolded and social selectivity is likely to corroborate. This paper analyzes whether information asymmetries exist and decrease students' likelihood to apply for merit-based scholarships. In a randomized field experiment, I exposed more than 5,000 German students either to general information on federally funded scholarships or additionally to tailored information on details of the application process, conveyed by a similar role model. The role model treatment did significantly increase non-academic and male students' application probabilities for federally funded merit-based scholarships. Providing only general information on the scholarship system triggered participants' own information search for alternative funding sources and increased application rates for other, not federally funded scholarships.

JEL-codes: D83 I22 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113058

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