Tax Evasion, Corruption and tax Loopholes

André Seidel and Sugata Marjit

VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental for a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.

JEL-codes: D73 D82 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes (2017)
Journal Article: Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145635

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