The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

JEL-codes: C02 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2016)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
Working Paper: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145647

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