Coevolution of Cooperation, Preferences and Cooperative Signals in Social Dilemmas

Stephan Müller and Georg von Wangenheim

VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended Prisoner's Dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium -- a transitional equilibrium -- which is constituted and stabilized by the dynamic interaction of multiple Bayesian equilibria. A transitional equilibrium: (1) exists under mild conditions and (2) can stabilize a population that is characterized by the heterogeneity of behavior, preferences, and signaling. We thereby offer an explanation for persistent regularities observed in laboratory and field data on cooperative behavior. Furthermore, this type of equilibria is least demanding with respect to differences in signaling cost between 'conditional cooperators' and 'opportunists'. Indeed and quite surprisingly, a transitional equilibrium is consistent with 'conditional cooperators' bearing higher signaling cost in terms of fitness than 'opportunists'.

JEL-codes: C73 D64 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145713

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