How Much Priority Bonus Should be Given to Registered Organ Donors? An Experimental Analysis
Annika Herr and
Hans-Theo Normann
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Abstract:
Experiments show that prioritizing registered donors on the waiting list impressively increases the willingness to register as an organ donor. We are the first to provide a comparative-statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods a registered person can skip on the waiting list. Our results indicate that a higher number of bonus periods significantly improves registration rates whereas a small bonus of only one period is of minor significance.
JEL-codes: C90 I10 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis (2019)
Working Paper: How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168072
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