Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics

Sebastian Fehrler, Urs Fischbacher and Maik Schneider

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We examine the incentives to self-select into politics. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model’s key predictions, we find that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race.

JEL-codes: C92 D71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-soc
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168083/1/VfS-2017-pid-2103.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168083

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