The true art of the tax deal: Evidence of aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements

Julia Braun and Martin Zagler

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Nash bargaining model shows that a deal is struck only if both countries mutually benefit. • The model predicts voluntary signature of asymmetric double tax agreements only if there is compensation for the capital importer. Empirical evidence indicates that foreign aid from the capital exporter to the capital importer increases on average by 6 million USD In the signature year of a double tax agreement

JEL-codes: H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements (2018)
Working Paper: The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements (2017)
Working Paper: The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168084

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