Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Competitive Advantages: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

Florian Kaposty, Andreas Pfingsten and Christian Domikowsky

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: First, this study empirically explores whether it is possible to offer full insurance for non-financial depositors whilst maintaining market discipline. Second, we analyze whether a more credible deposit insurance scheme can be a competitive advantage for banks in a systemic crisis. We find (1) evidence for market discipline, and (2) banks ceteris paribus achieving higher growth rates of customer deposits in the financial crisis if they are part of a credible deposit insurance scheme.

JEL-codes: G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ias and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168146/1/VfS-2017-pid-2733.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168146

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().