Regulating False Discloure

Maarten Janssen

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Firms can communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and disclosure where disclosure may be deliberately false. We examine the effect of regulation that penalizes false disclosure by firms in a competitive setting. The cost of false disclosure influences the mix of direct, costly information provision and price signaling in the market, and thereby market outcomes. Regulation reduces prices and the consumption distortion associated with price signaling.

JEL-codes: D43 D82 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168159

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