Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions

Monika Köppl-Turyna and Jarosław Kantorowicz

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms in Poland. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168163/1/VfS-2017-pid-2907.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Disentangling the fiscal effects of local constitutions (2019)
Working Paper: Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168163

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