(Un-)Stable Preferences, Beliefs, and the Predictability of Behaviour

Irenaeus Wolff

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: I show that whether participants generally believe in others’ preference stability is a crucial determinant of behaviour. Whether a participant’s behaviour can be predicted by her best-response or a Nash-equilibrium in a context where she can observe others' elicited preferences depends heavily both on the participant having stable preferences and on her generally believing in others’ preference stability. The latter is true because such a belief is associated with less dispersed beliefs.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-hpe and nep-neu
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168231

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