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A Theory of Autocratic Transition. Prerequisites to Self-Enforcing Democracy

Thomas Apolte

VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.

Keywords: self-enforcing democracy; political regimes; autocratic transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D74 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/181500/1/VfS-2018-pid-11488.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: A theory of autocratic transition: Prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy (2018) Downloads
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