Weighted Committee Games

Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer () and Stefan Napel

VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Players in a committee, council, or electoral college often wield asymmetric numbers of votes. Binary decision environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe decisions on three or more alternatives in similarly succinct fashion. We compare different voting weight configurations for plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The respective geometries and very different numbers of structurally non-equivalent committees have escaped notice so far. They determine voting equilibria, the distribution of power, and other aspects of collective choice.

Keywords: voting games; weighted voting; geometry of voting; voting power; Borda rule; Copeland rule; plurality; antiplurality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/181561/1/VfS-2018-pid-13367.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Weighted committee games (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181561

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().