Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging

Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl and Israel Waichman

VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Manipulating choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') raises problems of ethicality. Giving individuals control over their default choice ('selfnudges') is a possible remedy, but the trade-offs with efficiency are poorly understood. We examine under four different information structures how subjects set own defaults in social dilemmas and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous defaults, a social (full cooperation) and a selfish (perfect free-riding) nudge. Subjects recruited from the general population (n = 1,080) play a ten-round, ten-day voluntary contribution mechanism online, with defaults triggered by the absence of an active contribution on the day. We find that individuals' own choice of defaults structurally differs from full cooperation, empirically affirming the ethicality problem of social nudges. Allowing for self-nudges instead of social nudges reduces efficiency at the group level, however. When individual control over nudges is non-negotiable, self-nudges need to be made public to minimize the ethicality-efficiency trade-off.

Keywords: Choice architecture; defaults; public goods; self-nudge; online experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-nud
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Working Paper: Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging (2023)
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