Eigentumsformen und die Leistungsfähigkeit marktwirtschaftlicher Koordination

Heike Walterscheid

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) from Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik

Abstract: Performance of market coordination crucially depends on the quality of property rights as a bundle of several acting rights. Since acting rights can be created, changed or abandoned within the political system, the scopes of political decision making processes have a deep impact on the quality of property rights respectively on the quality and form of property The source of a faulty structure of acting rights can be found on the constitutional level of a societal system. Politicians are enabled to arbitrarily transform the structure of acting rights in capitalism from a more or less decentralized structure into centralized structures of acting rights found in socialism. Thus, in the context of rent seeking and lobbyism a wide range of discretionary political decision making options will adversely affect market coordination and therefore the distribution of wealth.

Keywords: Property Rights; Rules Regulation; Market Economy; Externalities; Lobbyism; Sovereignty; Liability; Structural Couplings; Public Choice; Fractionation; Democracy; Political Participation; Preferences; Social Systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vswi15:140888

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