How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption

Matthias Bujko, Christian Fischer, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks

No 2014-02, Discussion Paper Series from University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy

Abstract: Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Keywords: large-scale land acquisitions; land grabbing; foreign investments; weak institutions; property rights; corruption; large-N study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 O13 Q15 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption (2016)
Working Paper: How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201402

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