Land grabbing and ethnic conflict

Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks

No 2016-04, Discussion Paper Series from University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy

Abstract: We study the effect of large-scale land acquisitions on the risk of ethnic tensions for a sample of 133 countries for the 2000-2012 period. Running a series of fractional response models, we find that more land grabbing activity is associated with a higher risk of ethnic tensions, indicating that the negative effects of land deals outweigh their potential benefits. In addition to that, we also show that democratic institutions may moderate the relationship between land deals and ethnic tensions. That is, non-democratic countries face a substantially higher risk of ethnic tensions as the level of large-scale land acquisitions increases; by contrast, strongly democratic countries tend to see lower ethnic tension risk.

Keywords: large-scale land acquisitions; land grabbing; conflict; ethnic tensions; democratic accountability; weak institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F63 O13 O43 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict (2016)
Working Paper: Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201604

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