Where do migrants from countries ridden by environmental conflict settle? On the scale, selection and sorting of conflict-induced migration

Tim Krieger, Laura Renner and Lena Schmid

No 2019-03, Discussion Paper Series from University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy

Abstract: Environmentally induced conflicts can trigger migration. This paper analyzes the location decisions of migrants, i.e., the "sorting" of migrants into alternative destinations. We argue that this sorting depends on a variety of factors. The selection of migrants affects preferences over where to settle and depends on the underlying type of environmentally induced conflict. In addition to (transport-related) migration costs, migration governance shapes the sorting pattern of migrants. Immigration policies in destination countries impose further costs to migration or even prevent settlement. At the same time, national immigration policies depend on the "supply" of migrants that are expected to arrive, as well as on other countries' policies regarding immigration. In addition, coordination failure of destination countries may feed back to the sorting decisions of migrants. The chapter discusses sorting not only from a theoretically but also empirical perspective, thereby highlighting both existing studies on sorting and the empirical challenges to analyzing sorting behavior in the context of migration that is induced by environmental conflict.

Keywords: environmental and climate change; conflict; migration; emigration; selection; sorting; migration governance; theory; empirics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F22 J61 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-int and nep-mig
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201903

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