Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung: Markt, Staat oder beides?

Sascha von Berchem and Norbert Berthold

No 70, Discussion Paper Series from Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy

Abstract: Free and competitive insurance markets are not able to provide a system which can be considered economically efficient to deal with the material risks of unemployment. Nor are individual unemployment insurance savings accounts – even when regulated by the state – a superior alternative. If the economic feasibility of an unemployment insurance system is not in itself to be put at risk, coverage must in general be the responsibility of the state. However, the present design of state unemployment insurance can only be regarded as very inefficient and requiring urgent comprehensive reform. An increase in individual freedom and responsibility, as well as more competition are at the heart of a promising modern reform concept which takes into account the specific nature of the risk inherent in unemployment.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/22310/1/dp70.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wuewwb:70

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().