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Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression

Dominik Rothenhäusler, Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We study how institutional design influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share guilt more easily. This facilitates becoming a supporter. Conversely, an institution requiring more supporters must rely on people who have higher individual moral standards. We analyze individual thresholds for agreeing to a transgression, depending on the available options for sharing guilt by institutional design. On the aggregate level, we study how institutions affect the likelihood of immoral outcomes.

Keywords: Moral Decision Making; Shared Guilt; Group Absolution; Diffused Responsibility; Institutional Design; Committee Decisions; Moral Transgression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D23 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/76878/1/751433284.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression (2013) Downloads
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