More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance

Steffen Huck, Nora Szech and Lukas M. Wenner

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-neu
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Related works:
Working Paper: More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design, and Performance (2016)
Working Paper: More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design and Performance (2015)
Working Paper: More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance (2015)
Working Paper: More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance (2015)
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