Assessing the effects of a road surfacing cartel in Switzerland

Kai Hüschelrath, Nina Leheyda () and Patrick Frank Ernst Beschorner
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 09-082, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: The paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the decision. The results indicate that the detection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Evaluation; Cartels; Switzerland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29641/1/615813836.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF A ROAD-SURFACING CARTEL IN SWITZERLAND (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09082

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