Antitrust immunity for airline alliances

Volodymyr Bilotkach and Kai Hüschelrath
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 10-080, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: The market developments in international air transportation have led to the dominance of three global airline alliances - Star, SkyTeam and oneworld. At the same time, members of these alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including scheduling and pricing decisions, as well as the right to form revenue-sharing joint ventures in international markets. Although the significant consumer benefits generated by airline cooperation are undisputed, the recent developments raise antitrust concerns. Against this background, the paper compares the key competitive effects of airline alliances and antitrust immunity with the economic lines of reasoning in recent policy actions to develop recommendations for a full-fledged assessment of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.

JEL-codes: K21 L41 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR AIRLINE ALLIANCES (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10080

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