The national regulatory structure against the background of the European regulatory system

Tobias Veith ()

No 10-089, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: States and their representatives, national governments, play a key role in national telecommunication markets. As lawmakers, they determine the playing field of the agents in the markets and the decision powers of national regulators. Simultaneously, they are involved in appointing presidential chambers of national regulators. On the other hand, governments keep shares in regulated companies and support single infrastructure projects based on financial and legal state aid measures. Therefore, European Union regulatory frameworks require a strict separation of tasks between national ministries. However, the European Commission has repeatedly criticized member states for in-transparency and insufficient separations of tasks in national implementation. While the Second Regulatory Package balanced competition and investment aims, the new Regulatory Package implemented in December 2009 dedicates a higher weight to the role of infrastructure quality as a driver of service innovations. Moreover, national regulators become more independent, and former national regulation tasks are partially shifted to the pan-European level. In consequence, the role of governments also changes. I discuss the transposition process of Regulatory Packages to national laws and how they have been implemented on the national level to learn more about how the new Regulatory Package will affect the national situation and the European integration process.

Keywords: telecommunication infrastructure; local loop competition; regulatory independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L13 L43 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10089

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