R&D collaboration with uncertain intellectual property rights

Dirk Czarnitzki, Katrin Hussinger and Cédric Schneider

No 11-010, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy.

Keywords: R&D collaboration; intellectual property; uncertainty; patents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11010

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