Giving away the game? The impact of the disclosure effect on the patenting decision

Diana Heger and Alexandra Zaby

No 12-010, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This article explores the propensity to patent in the light of the disclosure effect. Unlike earlier approaches concerned with the patenting decision, we take into account that a disclosure effect may decrease the merits of patenting by facilitating inventing around the patent for competitors. In our theoretical model, we find that the disclosure effect - contingent on the competitive environment of the inventor - possibly has substantial negative effects on the propensity to patent. An empirical investigation of the theoretical results finds support for the proposed effects.

Keywords: Patenting decision; secrecy; disclosure requirement; patent breadth; horizontal product differentiation; circular city (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L24 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12010

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