Cartel enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the duration of investigations

Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 12-071, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission's speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Empirical Analysis; Cartels; European Union; Fines; Leniency; Duration of Investigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-hme and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12071

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