Patent litigation settlement in Germany: Why parties settle during trial

Katrin Cremers (katrin.cremers@gmail.com) and Paula Schliessler

No 12-084, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper looks at the decision to settle patent litigation in Germany from a new angle by focusing on detailed data on within-trial actions and motivations by plain-tiff, defendant and the courts. Using a new dataset covering about 80% of all patent litigation cases in Germany between 2000 and 2008 we estimate the likelihood of within-trial settlement. We find that the within-trial settlement decision is to some degree driven by the proceedings that change the pre-trial setting of the negotiations in terms of information and stakes and make previously refused settlement a new option. Additionally, firm-specific stakes as measured by the relation of the involved parties to the disputed patent as well as firm-specific strategies are found to affect the general willingness to settle after the filing of a court case. The results suggest that pre-trial failure of settlement negotiations can to some extent be offset by within-trial settlement through efforts made by court and involved parties, but that the disposition to settle is to a larger degree determined by firm-specific stakes and strategies in the case.

Keywords: Patent; Patent Litigation; Settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Patent litigation settlement in Germany: why parties settle during trial (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12084

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