Public and private enforcement of competition law: A differentiated approach

Kai Hüschelrath and Sebastian Peyer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 13-029, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between public and private enforcers introducing a more differentiated approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we take into account that the costs and benefits of detection and prosecution and, thus, the usefulness of each enforcement mode may change with a variation of the type of anticompetitive conduct. We define a set of parameters that determine the costs and benefits of both types to enforce the antitrust laws and discuss implications for European competition law and policy.

Keywords: Competition policy; public enforcement; private enforcement; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13029

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