Direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism
Zareh Asatryan,
Thushyanthan Baskaran,
Theocharis Grigoriadis and
Friedrich Heinemann
No 13-038, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Abstract:
This paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. In the first part of the paper, we establish the relationship between referenda activity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all 2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011. This selection on observables approach, however, suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application. The main part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD). To safeguard against co-treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simultaneously at the same thresholds, we validate our results by extending the RDD approach to a difference-in-discontinuity (DiD) design. By studying direct legislation in an archetypical cooperative federation as Germany, our paper extends the literature to a novel institutional setting. The results indicate that in our setting - and in contrast to most of the evidence from Switzerland and the US - direct democracy causes an expansion of local government budgets.
Keywords: direct democracy; fiscal policy; regression discontinuity; Bavaria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
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Journal Article: Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism (2017) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13038
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