Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive

Dirk Foremny, Ronny Freier, Marc-Daniel Moessinger and Mustafa Yeter

No 14-099, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.

Keywords: election cycles; municipal expenditures; council and mayor elections; instrumental variables approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H71 H72 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive (2015)
Working Paper: Overlapping Political Budget Cycles in the Legislative and the Executive (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14099

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