Path dependencies versus efficiencies in regulation: Evidence from "old" and "new" broadband markets in the EU

Wolfgang Briglauer, Enrico Maria Camarda and Ingo Vogelsang

No 18-051, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent panel data on 27 European Union member states taking into account endogeneity of the underlying regulation and market structure variables. Our empirical specification employs three different estimators based on instrumental variables in order to identify causal effects. We find evidence supporting both regulators pursuing normative objectives and inefficiencies related to regulatory path dependence, bureaucracy goals and an inadequate consideration of competition from mobile broadband networks. Our results call for adjustments in the institutional design of the decision making process under the current European Union regulatory framework.

Keywords: broadband markets; "old" and "new" networks; EU regulatory framework; normative theory; positive theory; path dependence; bureaucracy; EU panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/187973/1/1041423632.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Path dependencies versus efficiencies in regulation: Evidence from “old” and “new” broadband markets in the EU (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18051

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().