Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

Josue Ortega

No 18-052, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof. Both solutions are disjoint.

Keywords: dichotomous preferences; multi-unit assignment; Lorenz dominance; competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences (2020)
Working Paper: Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18052

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