Fair cake-cutting in practice

Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi

No 18-053, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We nd that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their proportional counterparts, despite the fact that agents very often manipulate them. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy- free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also nd that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning reduces truth-telling behavior, but also reduces envy.

Keywords: cake-cutting; Selfridge-Conway; cut-and-choose; envy; perceived fairness; preference manipulation; experimentation and learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Fair cake-cutting in practice (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18053

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