Vote buying in the US Congress

Ulrich Matter, Paolo Roberti and Michaela Slotwinski

No 19-052, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills.

Keywords: legislative voting; campaign finance; special interest groups; lobbying; forensic economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ore and nep-pol
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/207133/1/1683729560.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Vote Buying in the US Congress (2019)
Working Paper: Vote Buying in the U.S. Congress (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19052

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