Collaborative tax evasion in the provision of services to consumers: A field experiment

Annabelle Doerr and Sarah Necker

No 21-024, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home-improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market which allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.

Keywords: Collaborative tax evasion; evasion discount; undeclared work; third-party reporting; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 E26 H26 J22 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Journal Article: Collaborative Tax Evasion in the Provision of Services to Consumers: A Field Experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21024

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