Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care

Martin B. Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl and Nicolas Ziebarth ()

No 23-055, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

Keywords: Long-Term Care; Nursing Homes; Patient Incentives; Provider Incentives; Cost-Sharing; Episode-Based Reimbursement; Medicaid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H51 H75 I11 I13 I18 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-hea
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/280928/1/1876362065.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care (2024)
Working Paper: Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care (2023)
Working Paper: Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long Term Care (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:280928

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