Double Standards in Educational Standards: Are Disadvantaged Students Being Graded More Leniently?

Oliver Himmler and Robert Schwager

No 07-016, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: A simple model of decentralised graduation standards is presented. It is shown that a school whose students are disadvantaged on the labour market applies less demanding standards because such students have less incentives to graduate. The model's predictions are tested using Dutch school-level data. Since students in the Netherlands have to participate both in a central and in a school specific examination, we can identify the grading policy of individual schools. We find that schools which harbour greater shares of disadvantaged students tend to set lower standards. This effect is largest in the branch of secondary schooling preparing for university.

Keywords: education; grading; social status; schools; Netherlands (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5504

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