What Does Europe Pay for Clean Energy? Review of Macroeconomic Simulation Studies

Astrid Dannenberg, Tim Mennel and Ulf Moslener

No 07-019, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper analyses the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European energy markets on the basis of existing macroeconomic simulation studies. The analysis comprises the European emssion trading scheme, energy taxes, measures in the transport sector, and the promotion of renewable energy sources. We find that these instruments affect the European economy, in particular the energy intensive industries and the industries that produce internationally tradeable goods. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, the costs of environmental regulation appear to be modest. The underlying environmental targets and the efficient design of regulation are key determinants for the cost burden.

Keywords: Environmental regulation; energy market; macroeconomic costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q21 Q28 Q41 Q43 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: What does Europe pay for clean energy?--Review of macroeconomic simulation studies (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5507

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