Pre-empting Technology Competition Through Firm Acquisitions

Christoph Grimpe and Katrin Hussinger

No 07-027, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper investigates the motive of pre-empting technology competition through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Exploiting the patent application procedure at the European Patent Office we introduce a new measure for the possibility to create entry barriers in technology markets. Our results show significant evidence that firms engage in horizontal M&A to pre-empt competition in technology markets.

Keywords: pre-empting technology competition; mergers and acquisitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L20 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-mic and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Pre-empting technology competition through firm acquisitions (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5590

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