Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

Astrid Dannenberg, Thomas Riechmann, Bodo Sturm and Carsten Vogt

No 07-034, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.

Keywords: individual preferences; inequity aversion; experimental economics; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5693

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